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The issue of whether or not a civilian is culpable for having directly participated in hostilities, 
as per Article 51(3) of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions is a complex and 
highly controversial issue.   further complexity is faced when considering the issue of targeting, 
and whether an individual may be legitimately targeted for his/her direct participation in hostilities. 
The aim of this paper is to examine the issue and to pose an alternative mechanism so as to provide 
a practical test to determine an individuals’ status.  it also calls upon international jurists to provide 
much needed guidance.
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INtRODUCtION
The August conflict between the Russian federation and georgian government 
in the disputed regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia brought into sharp focus 
not only the actions of regular combatants, but also the behaviour and conduct of 
those civilians who engaged directly in the hostilities.  Media reports concerning 
the activities of a variety of Abkhazi and South Ossetian militiamen, bandits and 
armed gangs appears to highlight, yet again, the ‘democratisation of violence’2 
that features so commonly in such inter-ethnic conflict.  
Such alleged conduct does, however, give a practical example to illuminate the 
current circuitous debate at the international committee of the Red cross (icRc) 
regarding the precise meaning of the phrase direct participation in hostilities.
1 The quote is taken from a first world war recruitment poster in which a young girl sits on her father’s 
knee and asks him the question.  Available from http://beck.library.emory.edu/greatwar/postcard-
images/daddy.jpg
2 A phrase i attribute to the united Kingdom’s chief Rabbi Sir Dr Jonathan Sachs.  
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The reality of civilians participating directly or otherwise in hostilities is of 
course nothing new; phrases such as guerrilla, franc tireur, levee en masse and 
unprivileged belligerent3/combatant4 bear witness to the fact that civilian ‘soldiers’ 
have played a significant role in warfare throughout modern history.  This reality 
is neatly encapsulated by McLaughlin5 who appreciates and acknowledges that, 
‘…the armed conflict paradigm permits the use of lethal force against certain 
categories of people outside the situations of self-defence. It permits offensive 
operations (attack) where the use of lethal force is authorised against a person 
or a group who may permissibly be targeted within the bounds of IHL.  Provided 
that the requisite assessments are made, considerations balanced and precautions 
observed, the ‘enemy’ – be they formed units, levee en masse, militias, dissident 
organised armed groups or civilians taking a direct part in hostilities – may be 
attacked and killed.’  
The ‘democratisation of violence’, however, which emerges in the Post-Cold 
War World increases the incidence and awareness of the phenomenon.  The 
significance of this is epitomized by the concept of asymmetric conflict, arguably 
the very hallmark of the current ‘war on terror’, in which regular members of a 
state’s armed forces engage and indeed are, in turn, engaged by, irregular, often 
non-state forces.  These forces are loosely described as terrorists, militiamen 
or insurgents.  Significantly such concerns should not be viewed exclusively 
through the paradigm of the ‘war on terror’.  Perhaps the most tragic example 
of a civilian who participates directly in hostilities is the child soldier, those 
youngsters deliberately recruited to undertake heinous acts with unflinching 
loyalty. consequently the potential of a civilian engaging, for whatever reason, in 
direct combat was specifically recognised by Article 51 (3) of the first Additional 
Protocol, which provides that: ‘Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by 
this section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.’ 
As Best6 appreciates, ‘Civilians are advised that they will retain their protected 
status “unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities”, i.e. in 
the event of their so taking part in guerrilla warfare and living to tell the tale, they 
can go back to being civilians afterwards.’7  The phrase direct participation in 
hostilities appears, of itself, a simple and sufficiently innocuous phrase, but what, 
3 See for example Major R. R. Baxter, So-Called “Unprivileged Belligerency”: Spies, Guerrillas and 
Saboteurs, 1951 Brit. Y.B. int’l. L. 323
4 See for example Knut Dormann, The Legal Situation of “Unlawful/unprivileged Combatants”, 849 Int. 
Rev. Red cross 45 (2003) (Discussing the legal status of unlawful combatants)
5 Rob Mc Laughlin, The legal regime applicable to use of lethal force when operating under a United 
Nations Security Council Chapter VII mandate authorising “all necessary means”, 12 J.c. & S. L. 389, 
404 (2007) (Discussing the paradigm of warfare and legitimate military targeting)
6 Geoffrey Best, War & laW since 1945 255 clarendon Press 1997.
7 interestingly McLaughlin goes so far as to suggest that the ‘1949 Geneva Conventions, Common Article 
3, implicitly permits attack on civilians taking a direct or active part in hostilities by virtue of the fact 
that it precludes attack on “persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of the 
armed forces who have laid down their arms…’, see McLaughlin, note 5 at foot 57.  whilst such a 
position appears entirely logical it may come as a stark and unpleasant reminder of the perils of warfare 
to others.
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if any, situation(s) does it envisage precisely? is it equitable that certain behaviour 
conducted by civilians is regarded as constituting direct participation in hostilities, 
whilst other, apparently similar, behaviour is not? consider the following scenario 
as an example:
Night has fallen; a chill wind blows and eerie animal calls resonate across 
the open prairie.  The inhabitants of the cavalry outpost in the lonely timber fort 
suddenly realise that hostile forces, renegade indian braves or desperate bandits 
(depending on the title of the movie) surround them.  The soldiers and traders 
attend to the defence of the fort; the older women nurse the frightened children, 
whilst the plucky younger women however assist their men folk by loading and 
re-loading their rifles.  
This of course is a scene so familiar to the western film genre that it achieves 
cliché status, but whom, if anyone, in this scenario has taken a direct part in 
hostilities?  in seeking this determination a series of questions are posed which 
require some considerable analysis. The first issue to address is whether such a 
conflict is subject to the provisions of the first Additional Protocol, only then 
can one contemplate whether a nexus has, or needs, to be established between 
the hostilities and a wider armed conflict.  eventually we begin to consider the 
actions, and perhaps even the intentions, of those involved and seek to evaluate 
whether or not a sufficient causal link has been established so as to determine if 
they have participated directly. in loading the weapons have the women ‘directly 
participated’? In assisting the soldiers in the defence of the fort have the traders 
done so? in tending to the soldiers minor wounds, so that they can than return 
to their posts, have those providing medical aid also directly participated in the 
hostilities?  These are all issues which have been debated at great length by the 
Experts convened by the International Committee of the Red Cross and have 
informed present thinking on the nature of direct participation.
THE CURRENT DEBATE CONCERNINg PARTICIPATION
it appears that determining the scope and nature of the term direct participation 
in hostilities is as elusive as pinning down the description of baldness.    As Lindley8 
acknowledges, ‘[W]e know what perfect baldness would consist of. …It would be 
idle to attempt a precise definition of how many hairs, or what proportion of hair, a 
person must have lost in order to be correctly described as bald.’ This, admittedly 
flippant, comparison seeks to highlight the fundamental problems for practical 
application, faced by both humanitarian and military lawyers and perhaps most 
significantly by commanders on the ground, posed by musing the phrase direct 
participation in hostilities.  
whilst the fundamental basis of international humanitarian law is the principle 
of distinction, between belligerents (combatants) and non-belligerents (civilians 
8 richard lindley, autonomy (issues in Political theory) 69-70 PalGrave macmillan 1986
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and those rendered hors de combat), this distinction may become blurred in certain, 
albeit limited, circumstances.    The aim of this paper is, therefore, to examine the 
current debate and to highlight the problematic and apparently insurmountable 
concerns and issues, which emerge from the debate concerning the term direct 
participation in hostilities.  This author would seek to propose an alternative 
approach, which aims to bring a greater degree of clarity and certainty and also 
calls upon international courts and Tribunals to provide much needed practical 
guidance in this area.
As Rogers9acknowledges the question of who constitutes a member of the 
enemy’s armed forces is increasingly complex, ‘[I]n a conventional conflict 
between states such as the Falklands War of 1982, this is not difficult.  It is difficult 
when guerrilla tactics are adopted or irregular militias, paramilitary groups or 
resistance movements are involved in the fighting.’
The significance of this issue was recognised in the Summary Report of the Third 
Expert Meeting10, which acknowledged that, ‘… counter-insurgency operations 
targeted mainly persons not military objectives.  Therefore the notion of DPH was 
of utmost importance in situations of non-international armed conflict.  In practice 
most targeting decisions had to be taken in a ‘split second’ by an individual 
soldier, who had no time to seek additional guidance.  However, correct targeting 
was not only in the interest of the civilian population but also of the armed forces, 
because the erroneous killing of a peaceful civilian wholly alienated the civilian 
population and created new enemies.’  Last summer’s well documented attack by 
the united States Air force on a suspected Taliban stronghold, which led to the 
deaths of ninety civilians, including sixty children highlights, yet again, the grave 
concerns raised when a targeting decision proves erroneous11.
The technical complexities and legal challenges posed when making targeting 
decisions are regularly faced not only by coalition forces in iraq and NATO-
led forces in Afghanistan, but also by Russian federation and georgian forces 
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in which the ‘farmer by day, fighter by night’ 
scenario is significantly more than an exercise in academic curiosity.  Such 
apparent behaviour by civilians exposes and then seems to exploit the phrase ‘for 
such time’ contained within Article 51(3). This ‘revolving door’12 phenomenon 
appears to present a considerable degree of frustration to the efforts of the 
experts assembled by the ICRC to deliberate on the meaning of the term direct 
participation in hostilities.  Similar difficulties also arise from the activities of 
those ‘civilians’ employed by private military companies and engaged by state 
9 anthony P. v roGers, laW of the Battlefield 31 manchester university Press 2004
10 Summary Report of the Third expert Meeting on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, convened 
at geneva, 23 – 25 October 2005, at page 42.  Available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/
htmlall/participation-hostilities-ihl-311205/$File/Direct_participation_in_hostilities_2005_eng.pdf
11 See for example Jeremy Page, ’89 Afghan Civilians Die, in ‘tragic’ US air strike’, The Times, 25 
August 2008, at 1.
12 A phrase i attribute to Hays Parks, Air War and the Laws of War, 1 A. f. L. Rev. 118 (1990) (Discussing 
the issue of direct participation)
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governments, NgO’s or multinational corporations in iraq and elsewhere.  Are 
such ‘mercenaries’, participating directly in hostilities by guarding installations, 
providing equipment and training others?  Or, alternatively, are they engaged in 
everything but, their roles being merely auxiliary? (A position often advocated by 
those same companies and their clients.)  it perhaps comes as no surprise that as 
a consequence of the icRc convened meetings of experts the reams of materials 
which have been produced in recent years concerning these prescient questions, 
appears to grow exponentially.  Apparently very little, however, in the way of a 
definitive consensus emerges.
what may, therefore, be beneficial is a definitive set of practical legal principles 
from which lawyers and commanders can determine definitively whether or not a 
civilian has, or is, participating directly in hostilities.  Such an evaluation process 
could then form the basis of a targeting decision or determination of detainee 
status following arrest or capture.  issues which if determined incorrectly can 
have widespread and lasting detrimental consequences not only for the military 
commanders on the ground, but also upon policy makers at home.
The guidance currently available to both lawyers and military commanders 
is however far from being either adequate or satisfactory.  As Kretzmer13 
acknowledges, ‘[T]he ICRC Commentary on Additional Protocol I merely states 
that “direct” participation means acts of war which by their nature or purpose 
are likely to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the enemy 
armed forces.’  
Elements within the Experts second meeting14 believed that the consensus 
reached at the Diplomatic Conference was that direct participation in hostilities 
consisted of actual shooting and war fighting and that everything else did not 
constitute direct participation in hostilities.  One could surmise however, from 
the commentary, that a host of activities and individuals could be determined as 
participating directly in hostilities, if one was to read the phrase ‘acts of war…
likely to cause actual harm’ liberally. This conclusion is of course a result of not 
only a broad interpretation of the commentary, but also an acknowledgement of 
the ever-changing nature of warfare and weapons systems.  ‘Total war’ is just one 
example in which one could argue that a state’s entire population is in essence 
participating directly in hostilities.  
More practically, an increasing number of sophisticated weapons systems 
rely heavily on civilian contractors to not only maintain, but also to operate 
them.  Orakhelashivili15 cautions though that, ‘…if anything or anybody that is 
13 David Kretzmer, Targeted killing of suspected terrorists: Extra-judicial executions or legitimate means 
of defence? 16 eJiL 171, 192 (2005) (Discussing the commentary relating to Article 51(3).)
14 Summary Report of the Second expert Meeting on Direct Participation in Hostilities under international 
Humanitarian Law, convened at The Hague, 25 – 26 October 2004, at page 42.  Available at http://www.
icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/ htmlall/ participation-hostilities-ihl-311205/$File/Direct_participation_
in_hostilities_2004_eng.pdf
15 Alexander Orakhelashvili, The interaction between rights and humanitarian law: fragmentation, 
conflict, parallelism, or convergence?  19 eJiL 161, 167 (2008) (Discussing the definition of direct 
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potentially or prospectively viewed as a military target or unlawful combatant 
can be attacked, then any civilian target can be attacked because it can always 
potentially become or has in the past been part of combat action.  This is not 
an outcome that humanitarian law can accept.’  whilst naturally one would 
agree with the author that such a sweeping, universal definition is to be avoided, 
Orakhelashivili fails to provide any actual guidance as to how such a distinction, 
between a military target and non-military facility, is to be made.  So as to ensure 
that such an all-embracing conclusion of legitimate targeting is not reached Rogers16 
provides examples of the problem and lists the activities of civilians, which do 
constitute direct participation in hostilities.  whilst illustrative such examples do 
no provide a practical test, as the Experts17 appreciated the assessment of, ‘direct 
participation in hostilities   had to be made from the perspective of the soldier 
confronted with the situation and had to be linked to that soldier’s reasonable 
evaluation that the civilian in question, represented an actual threat to himself or 
his fellow soldiers.’  And that whilst such civilians should be accorded the benefit 
of the doubt, ‘…in urban warfare, a soldier confronted with armed civilians could 
not be expected to draw the distinction between plunder, looting and robbery but 
must be allowed to directly attack any civilian carrying a weapon, even if that 
civilian was only trying to loot a supermarket.’  Similarly the Experts appeared 
cognisant of the fact that making such a distinction was increasingly difficult, ‘…
particularly in societies where inter-clan rivalries escalated to the level of non-
international armed conflict.   In such situations, all clan members of fighting age 
had the tendency to get involved in atrocities against fellow civilians including 
women and children, acts that could well be regarded as direct participation in 
the hostilities.  The difficulty was exacerbated in situations of failed states, where 
it could be next to impossible to establish a specific act of inter-civilian violence 
was carried out on behalf of an identifiable party to the conflict.’  The activities 
of South Ossetian militiamen in seeking to ‘ethnically cleanse’ their villages of 
their georgian neighbours is only one example of such a dilemma.  The experts18 
did however conclude that, ‘[G]roups such as gangsters, pirates and mafia often 
operated in a grey zone where it was difficult to distinguish them from those 
involved in an armed conflict.  Clearly, groups could engage in hostilities for 
political or even purely economic interests that were beyond mere “private gain”. 
Such groups could not be regarded as ordinary mafia, but should be regarded as 
directly participating in hostilities.’   Whilst the tribal warlords in Afghanistan, 
North western Pakistan and Darfur may provide examples of such groups, do the 
South American drug cartels, Somali pirates or the Cosa Nostra?
Perhaps the most regrettable feature of the debate was the position adopted by 
the international criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in its judgment in 
participation)
16 Rogers, note 9 at page 11.
17 Third Summary Report, note 10 at pages 11-12.
18 Third Summary Report, note 10 at page 37.
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the case of Blaškić19, whereby the Trial Chamber appeared to declare itself, ‘…
content to define a civilian as the opposite of a combatant.’  In invoking Article 
51(3) of the First Additional Protocol, Delmas-Marty20 noted that, ‘…the Court 
derives the following definition: A civilian unlawful combatant is one who takes 
part in hostilities, directly, for such time as he or she does so.’  Whilst this remains 
consistent with the icRc commentary, one would suggest that this does not 
provide much in the way of any assistance to those concerned with the practicalities 
of applying Article 51(3).  furthermore one would also stress that this was very 
much a missed opportunity by such an eminent institution, which has in previous 
cases appeared to act teleologically, if not perhaps in a spirit of judicial activism, 
to bring about much clarity and guidance to the discipline.  One would of course 
concede that such an opportunity might arise in future, in particular in relation to 
the case of Thomas Lubanga currently before the international criminal court. 
without such guidance a potentially fatalistic approach of ‘i know it when i see 
it’, in relation to direct participation, may develop with potentially very grave 
consequences for all concerned.  
INDIRECT PARTICIPATION
The debate concerning direct participation in hostilities thus far appears to 
achieve little but to further complicate and obfuscate already murky legal waters, 
whilst frustrating those whose who argue that their own lives and those of their 
subordinates are threatened by civilian fighters who appear inviolate. 
what exactly constitutes direct participation?  This central question remains 
unresolved.  The experts21 appear to have acknowledged that, ‘[w]hen interpreting 
the notion of “direct participation in hostilities” it was preferable to remain as 
close as possible to actual fighting, because the more difficult it was to identify the 
decisive criteria in practice, the wider the interpretation of the notion of “direct 
participation” would be.’  This author naturally agrees with such a general 
principle, but would propose that rather than attempting to establish a decisive 
criteria relating to direct participation in hostilities, an alternative is considered, 
namely indirect participation in hostilities.  Such indirect participation is in practice 
far more frequent and could easily be argued to cover the activities of religious 
and medical personnel in addition to munitions workers, civilian defence company 
contractors, entertainers, (the USO Show celebrities for example), as well as the 
families of service personnel.  it would also include those civilians whose real 
participation in the hostilities is at greatest only marginal and ancillary, such as 
 
19 icTY Judgment in the case of Blaškić, (IT-95-14-T), Trial Chamber 3rd March 2000, § 180, cited in 
Mireille Delmas-Marty, The paradigm of the war crime: Legitimating inhuman treatment? 5 JICJ 584, 
590 (2007) (Discussing the icTY judgment in Blaškić)
20 Delmas-Marty, note 19, at page 590
21 Third Summary Report, note 10 at page 32. 
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caterers, cleaners and the like.  consequently those deemed to have participated 
only indirectly would avoid the perils of Article 51(3).
To determine such indirect participation one might suggest that the test may 
be gleaned from domestic criminal law, in particular the inchoate offences and 
specifically the law of attempt, whereby only those acts which are, ‘more than 
merely preparatory’22 to the commission of the offence are proscribed.  
An analogy may therefore be drawn in which an individual, or group of 
individuals, who are engaged in those acts which are merely preparatory are 
deemed to have participated only indirectly in hostilities and, are accordingly, 
to be treated as civilian non-combatants.  Such a position would therefore allow 
civilians to undertake relatively ancillary, auxiliary tasks, with a degree of certainty 
that their activities cannot be regarded as being direct participation in hostilities. 
Such activity could include “Bob” the truck driver, so beloved of the experts in 
the course of their deliberations, and so allow him to deliver his supplies to the 
front and return safely.  in determining which acts are merely preparatory, and 
which are more akin to direct participation the Experts23 themselves provide some 
guidance. They suggest in relation to the distinction between ordinary crime and 
direct participation in hostilities that, an evaluation and assessment, ‘…should be 
made based on the objective intention behind the act which can be objectively 
deduced from the way a conflict is being waged.’  equally such an equation 
could provide a practical test from which to determine whether an individual had 
participated directly or indirectly in hostilities.
This author would suggest that with some further development24 the notion of 
indirect participation has the potential to provide a non-exhaustive list and practical 
test which would satisfy the experts25 who advocated that, ‘[A]ny potential list 
should be used to identify criteria implementable on the battlefield and as an 
illustration of the general definition.’   One is of course conscious of the potential 
backlash that may be experienced if certain commanders conclude that military 
necessity and effectiveness is in any way hampered or impeded by an additional 
layer of ‘lawfare’26. 
The notion of indirect participation does not however alter the legitimacy of 
targeting installations of military significance. if read cynically, the targeting of 
22 See for example uK criminal Attempts Act, 1981 c1 § 1(1) (eng & wales)
23 Second Summary Report, note 14 at page 4.
24 including perhaps the notion of “but for” causation advocated by Prof. Michael Schmitt, see Second 
Summary Report, note 14 at page 11) Such a concept may be most useful, post facto, in determining 
whether an individual had in fact participated directly in hostilities.
25 Summary Report of the first expert Meeting on Direct Participation in Hostilities under international 
Humanitarian Law, convened at geneva, 2nd June 2003, at page 2.  Available at http://www.icrc.org/
Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/participation-hostilities-ihl-311205/$File/Direct%20participation%20
in%20hostilities-Sept%202003.pdf
26 i attribute the term ‘lawfare’ to Major general charles J. Dunlop Jr., uSAf see Lawfare Today: 
A Perspective, Yale J. int’l Affs, (winter 2008) at 146.  This author however seeks to apply it in a 
potentially derogatory context.
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a weapons factory or ammunition shipment would still be deemed a legitimate 
target, with the resulting civilian deaths being deemed mere collateral damage. 
However, by demonstrating the concept of merely preparatory acts, the notion of 
indirect participation emphasises the fact that direct participation in hostilities, 
with respect to the actions of individuals, is limited only to actual combat as 
opposed to the plethora of surrounding supporting roles and tasks.  This may 
consequently possibly mitigate, as the experts27 recognised, the almost Orwellian 
idea of treating some civilians ‘as more civilian than others’, a concern which is 
perhaps more concerning in relation to the temporal issue contained within Article 
51(3). 
THE TEMPORAL SCOPE
The Experts28, who questioned whether, ‘…members of organised armed 
groups are “civilians” and thus subject to direct attack only for such time as 
they directly participate in the hostilities’, identified the nub of this concern.  As 
Orakhelashvili29 identifies, ‘the temporal limitation included in Article 51(3) of 
Additional Protocol I is absolutely crucial to maintaining intact the entire system 
of the civilian/military targets distinction.  In order to be workable, this distinction 
must draw straightforward distinction in terms which targets can be attacked and 
which cannot.’
Yet again an apparently simple phrase, ‘and for such time’, leads to incredible 
feats of military legal contortions, as noted above, though the ‘revolving door’ 
argument leads to serious practical concerns for both lawyers and commanders on 
the ground.  faced with such questions the Supreme court of israel in the case of 
The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel et al v. The Government of Israel30, 
examined the issue of whether suspected terrorists can be deemed to be legitimate 
targets according to Article 51(3).  The court held that, ‘[R]egarding the scope 
of the wording “and for such time” there is no consensus in the international 
literature … with no consensus regarding the interpretation of the wording “for 
such time”, there is no choice but to proceed from case to case31.’  Ben-Naftazi32 
declares that, ‘[T]he analysis of the third, temporal, element (‘For such time’) is 
the least satisfactory: The Court does not, in fact, offer a standard by which that 
time is measured.  Instead, it stipulates guidelines carrying a deterrence effect on 
future operations.’
27 first Summary Report, note 25 at page 1.
28 Third Summary Report, note 10, at page 41.
29 Orakhelashvili, note 15, at page 167.
30 HcJ 769/02 The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel et al v. The Government of Israel [2005] 
B.H.R.c. 7 31 
31 Ibid, at para. 39
32 Orna Ben-Naftazi, A judgment in the shadow of international criminal law 5 JICJ 322, 329 (2007) 
(Discussing the Public Committee case.)
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A debate therefore emerges as to whether the ‘revolving door’ even exists. 
Kretzmer33 notes that,  ‘[P]rofessor Cassese is adamant (in his opinion before 
the israeli Supreme court) that this term must be given a narrow meaning.’ 
consequently ‘[I]t is only while the persons are actually engaged in carrying 
out their hostile acts that they may be targeted.  As soon as they have completed 
the hostile act, they once again enjoy the same protection as every other 
civilian.’  Kretzmer also identifies the fact that such a position is supported by the 
Commentary.  
Others seek to differ; significantly The inter-American commission on 
Human Rights expressed a contrasting opinion.  As Kretzmer34 acknowledges, 
‘[I]n discussing Art. 51(3) of API the Commission stated that non-combatants 
who take a direct part in hostilities temporarily forfeit their immunity from direct 
individualized attack during such time as they assume the role of combatant.  The 
Commission added: “It is possible in this connection, however, that once a person 
qualifies as a combatant, whether regular or irregular, privileged or unprivileged, 
he or she cannot revert back to civilian status or otherwise alternate between 
combatant and civilian status.”35
it may, therefore, be preferable to address the notion of ‘for such time’, as the 
israeli court suggests, on a case-by-case basis, as opposed to adopting a universal, 
perhaps utilitarian approach, which favours one position above another.  equally, 
it may prove beneficial to view the temporal element purely from a post facto 
perspective when dealing with individuals who have directly participated in 
hostilities, so as to determine their detainee status after the event.  following on 
from this, this author would suggest that in relation to targeting decisions the 
temporal issue is wholly eliminated from the decision, therefore permitting the 
targeting of individuals only for so long as they are actually directly participating 
in hostilities.  This does not, however, permit them the benefit of the revolving 
door, rather the contrary.  
This approach appreciates the guidance found in the israeli Supreme court’s 
judgment, which introduces the possibility of exploring alternative means of 
eliminating the potential threat posed by individuals who do engage in hostilities. 
The court suggests that prior to a lethal attack other non-lethal means are first 
exhausted, such as arrest, investigation and prosecution.  Similarly military 
commanders and law enforcement officials are entitled to seek the arrest of 
individuals known to have committed, or to be suspected of having committed, acts 
of violence or perfidious conduct.  Should it be necessary such law enforcement 
33 Kretzmer, note 13, at page 108.
34 Kretzmer, note 13, at footnote 101
35 inter-American commission Report on Terrorism and Human Rights cited in Kretzmer, note 13 at 
footnote 101.  A position which Parks also advocates, note 12.  Parks claims that an individual once 
engaged directly in combat cannot revert to his/her previous civilian status.  Surely this position is also 
subject to criticism of its temporal scope; in a protracted conflict of many years duration is it right that 
an individual whose participation was some considerable time in the past is sill subject to targeting 
based on his previous direct participation in hostilities?
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and/or military elements may resort to lethal force in order to defend themselves 
whilst seeking to affect the arrest of such an individual(s).  This approach may as 
a consequence reduce unnecessary civilian casualties and so reduce the potential 
for further hostility.
In disaggregating the two concepts the practical application of Article 51(3) 
may become possible.
A ROLE FOR INTERNATIONAL COURTS OR TRIBUNALS?
The lack of further guidance as to the precise meaning and nature of the term 
‘direct participation in hostilities’ allows an increasingly broad interpretation of 
the phrase, which may prove problematic in its potential to incorporate within 
its ambit, those activities which may be, in reality far, more marginal to military 
operations than they first appear.  
Such a concern is seen in the response to the judgment in the case of The 
Public Committee Against Torture.  Schondorf36 suggests that in, ‘[A]pplying the 
elements of Article 51(3), the Court adopted a relatively expansive interpretation 
of the term ‘taking direct part in hostilities’, including in its ambit “a person who 
collects intelligence for the army, whether on issues regarding the hostilities … 
, or beyond those issues … ; a person who transports unlawful combatants to or 
from the place where hostilities are taking place; a person who operates weapons 
which unlawful combatants use, or supervises their operation or provides service 
to them be the distance from the battlefield as it may.”37  furthermore as Kretzmer38 
similarly notes, ‘… in the commentary on the Joint Services Regulations of the 
Bundeswehr, the term (direct participation in hostilities) is widened to include 
“civilians who operate a weapons system, supervise such operation, or service 
such equipment”, as well as “preparation for a military operation and intention to 
take part therein”, provided they are directly related to hostilities and “represent 
a direct threat to the enemy”
As one noted above, the increasing role played by civilian contractors in 
supporting modern weapons systems creates a significant grey area which appears, 
from the quotation above, to place even the humblest maintenance technician in 
harms way.  Such an interpretation may appear expedient to some; the consequences 
of targeting such individuals may prove far more controversial. 
Such positions, as those quoted above, appear to reflect the opinions of 
some of the Experts39 who suggest that direct participation in hostilities does 
36 Roy S. Schondorf, The targeted killing judgment: a preliminary assessment 5 JICJ 301, 307 (2007) 
(Discussing the Public Committee case.)
37 The Public Committee Against Torture, note 30, at § 35
38 See dieter fleck (ed.), the handBook of humanitarian laW in armed conflict 232 oxford university 
Press1996, cited in Kretzmer, note 13, at page 192 and footnote 98.
39 Third Summary Report, note 10, at page 14
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not necessarily have to cause death, injury or destruction, therefore the concept 
of direct participation in hostilities would not be limited to traditional war 
fighting scenarios.  One would therefore repeat, what therefore does constitute 
direct participation in hostilities?  This lack of clarity may ultimately prove to 
be wholly counterproductive, as military lawyers and commanders may fail to 
agree on a working definition or practical test.  in such circumstances it could 
be that a small number of commanders simply ignore advice, or are unable to 
communicate it effectively to front line personnel. consequently war crimes 
and other grave breaches, which may have otherwise have been avoided, may 
occur and so further incite an insurgency.  This event could then have potentially 
devastating consequences to the prosecution of the conflict and wider implications 
for international opinion and relations.
it must be imperative upon the various international courts and Tribunals to 
provide much needed guidance on this issue, guidance which avoids all possible 
allegations of overly complex notions of ‘lawfare’ and that provides individual 
soldiers and commanders a basic, practical framework in which to conduct 
operations.  The Experts40 appeared to have reached a similar conclusion, when 
they acknowledged that, ‘[A]fter all, the criteria for “direct participation in 
hostilities  ” not only had to be sufficiently precise to allow the prosecution of the 
civilians in question after capture, but also simple and clear enough to remain 
understandable for the persons actually confronted with an operational situation.’ 
As Best41 appreciates, ‘[W]hat is oversimplified may be a better humanitarian 
working-tool than what has become endlessly complicated.’  In embracing 
simplicity and avoiding complexity much may be achieved.
CONCLUSION
It remains a depressing reality that civilians form the greatest proportion 
of victims in any contemporary armed conflict. Best42 acknowledges that, ‘ 
…”protection” is in fact a term of legal art’, and that ‘…civilians at large, civilians 
in general: How far they can actually enjoy the protection it promises must largely 
depend, as it always has done, on circumstances, politics, personalities, accident, 
luck and so on; things which the soldier never forgets, but the civilian hardly ever 
remembers.’  
However, despite such pessimism, it must also be acknowledged that an 
increasing number of civilians are consciously choosing to participate directly 
in hostilities and that this phenomenon appears to be growing with every new 
conflict.  furthermore such individuals, who for any number of reasons avoid 
direct membership of, or integration into, regular armed forces, often conduct 
40 Third Summary Report, note 10, at page 30
41 Best, note 3, at page 262.
42 Best, note 3, at page 256.
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hostilities in flagrant disregard to the laws and customs of war, as was witnessed, 
for example, in the case of Tadic43.  As the Experts44 noted, the raison d’etre of 
Article 51(3) was to recognise that, ‘…maximum protection for civilians was an 
important, but by no means the only purpose of the rule on direct participation 
in hostilities.  More particularly, the aim of the rule was also to strengthen the 
principle of distinction by keeping civilians away from the battlefield.  This was 
achieved by depriving any civilian of his or her protection against direct attack if he 
or she got involved in activities intended to harm the adversary.’  Whilst admirable, 
this distinction becomes increasingly difficult, if not practically impossible, in an 
age where the changes to the nature of armed conflict occur at such a rapid rate. 
changes not only to the equipment and personnel employed by the state, but also 
the impact of the ‘democratisation of violence’ in which the civilian fighter is an 
increasingly common feature necessitate an urgent re-assessment of legal rules, 
which now appear as outdated as a great war recruitment poster from which this 
author draws his title. 
Therefore in response to his daughters question, ‘Daddy, what did YOU do 
in the Great War?’  The father, if he himself questions whether he participated 
directly in the hostilities, may wish to first telephone his lawyer before providing 
her with an answer.
“TATA, ŠTO SI TI RADIO U VELIKOM RATU?”  
- IZRAVNO UčEŠĆE U NEPRIJATELJSTVIMA I MOgUĆE 
RJEŠENJE ZA SLOŽENU PRAVNU POZICIJU
Prema članku 51. (3) Prvog dodatka protokolu ženevskih konvencija pitanje kažnjivosti za 
civile koji izravno sudjeluje u neprijateljstvima je složeno i nadasve kontroverzno pitanje. Daljnju 
poteškoću izaziva otvaranje pitanja cilja napada, odnosno da li se pojedinca može legitimno napadati 
zbog njegovog izravnog učešća u neprijateljstvima. cilj ovog teksta je istražiti pitanje i postaviti 
alternativni mehanizam kako bi se osigurao praktični test određivanja statusa pojedinca. istodobno 
njime se pozivaju međunarodni pravnici kako bi osigurali toliko potrebno usmjerenje.
Ključne riječi: izravno sudjelovanje, neprijateljstva, ženevska konvencija, 
alternativni mehanizmi
43 Despite his best efforts, to appear a ‘big man’, before the icTY, Tadic, and his comrades, remained little 
more than a group of vicious thugs, who imagined themselves ‘soldiers’ but yet chose to operate outside 
the realms of the laws and customs of war.
44 Third Summary Report, note 10, at page 20.
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